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TRUST AND SOCIAL COMMERCE 
Julia Y. Lee* 
ABSTRACT 
Internet commerce has transformed the marketing of goods and services. The 
separation between point of sale and seller, and the presence of geographically 
dispersed sellers who do not engage in repeated transactions with the same 
customers challenge traditional mechanisms for building the trust required for 
commercial exchanges. In this changing environment, legal rules and institutions 
play a diminished role in building trust. Instead, new systems and methods are 
emerging to foster trust in one-shot commercial transactions in cyberspace. 
The Article focuses on the rise of “social commerce,” a socio-economic 
phenomenon centered on the use of social media and other modes of social 
connection in electronic commerce. It identifies three mechanisms that are central 
to the development of trust in social commerce: communication and voluntary 
disclosure; barriers to entry; and community policing. These mechanisms simulate 
the characteristics of closely-knit environments, creating conditions conducive to 
trust. The Article describes these mechanisms in four new commercial settings: the 
sharing economy; next generation electronic commerce; online escort services; 
and online black markets in credit cards and controlled substances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many forms of commercial exchange require some degree of trust, as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma underlies most commercial transactions. The parties hope to 
mutually benefit from entering into the transaction, but each fears that the other 
side will cheat.1 In a one-shot game, the buyer would have the highest payoff from 
taking the goods or services without paying for them. The seller would have the 
highest payoff from taking the money, but delivering worthless goods.2 Rational 
choice theory predicts that in one-shot exchanges, the parties will either defect 
(cheat) or refrain from entering into the transaction.3 
Numerous formal and informal mechanisms alter the payoffs such that 
cooperation becomes the optimal strategy. Contracts allow parties to promise to 
perform and submit to penalties in the event of nonperformance. Laws impose civil 
and criminal liability for defection. Norms—informal rules that are not issued by 
courts or legislatures, nor enforced by legal sanctions—constrain self-interested 
behavior through social sanctions such as gossip and ostracism.4 Repeated 
interactions between the same parties perform a similar function.5 In what Robert 
Axelrod dubbed the “shadow of the future,” each player cooperates with the other, 
knowing that defection will be retaliated in kind in a future game.6 
                                                          
 
1 Douglas G. Baird, Self-Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 583, 583 
(1990). 
2 See id. at 583–84; see also Susan Block-Lieb, e-Reputation: Building Trust in Electronic Commerce, 
62 LA. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2002). 
3 Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and the Law, 82 
S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 229 n.65 (2009); see also Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous 
Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 351 (1981); 
Elinor Ostrom, Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Reputation, in TRUST AND 
RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 19, 55 (Elinor Ostrom & 
James Walker eds., 2003). 
4 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 
(1963); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 365, 365 (1997). 
5 See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and 
Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 393 (1994). 
6 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 176 (1984); see also W. Bradley Wendel, 
Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. 
L.J. 1, 10 (2002). 
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In addition, if the two players trust one another, they may overcome the 
dilemma. The amount of trust required may vary based on the product, market, 
geographical proximity of the parties, and course of dealing, among other factors. 
On one end of the spectrum, low-value, low-risk transactions require low levels of 
trust. For instance, purchasers of rice may easily and quickly determine its quality 
by rubbing a few grains together between blocks of wood.7 Hence, rice has been 
historically sold among strangers in open air markets. 
By contrast, high-value, high-risk transactions where quality cannot be readily 
ascertained require greater levels of trust. For instance, “experience goods” are 
characterized by the inability to assess quality through simple examination—
knowledge of quality can only be gained through experience.8 Raw rubber is a 
high-risk product because its quality is not apparent at the point of sale—its quality 
can be known only after it has been processed.9 As a consequence, producers 
fastidiously guard their reputations and sell rubber through trusted brokers with 
whom they share a long-term relationship.10 
In conditions of high uncertainty, the need for trust is greater,11 but the 
willingness to trust depends on individual past experiences and the presence of 
risk-reducing contextual and structural variables. These can include institutional 
protections such as formal law or extra-legal mechanisms such as reputation and 
social norms. Other variables can include ethnic or religious homogeneity, face-to-
face contact, and group size. For instance, small, tightly-knit communities are more 
conducive to trust formation than impersonal, loosely-knit groups. 
While often low-value, commercial transactions in cyberspace can be high-
risk. Transactions tend to be impersonal, heterogeneous, one-shot, and non-face-to-
face. Transaction amounts often are very small and parties are located in distant 
jurisdictions. This can render legal recourse either impractical or unavailable.12 
                                                          
 
7 Peter Kollock, The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, 
Commitment, and Trust, 100 AM. J. SOC. 313, 315 (1994). 
8 Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 312 (1970); see also 
DIEGO GAMBETTA, CODES OF THE UNDERWORLD: HOW CRIMINALS COMMUNICATE 197 (2009). 
9 Toshio Yamagishi & Midori Yamagishi, Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan, 18 
MOTIVATION & EMOTION 129, 134 (1994). 
10 Id. 
11 See Kollock, supra note 7, at 336–37. 
12 Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 62 LA. L. REV. 1165–66, 
1165 (2002). 
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Social norms have not readily emerged, given the impersonal, geographically 
dispersed nature of most transactions. Nor have parties sought security through 
traditional means such as transacting only with known counterparties or limiting 
their transactions to members of their own ethnic or religious groups. Ironically, 
however, the non-face-to-face, non-iterated, impersonal, and sequential nature of 
exchange relationships in cyberspace—conditions that seem to inhibit trust 
formation—also increase the potential for trust. 
Despite conditions seemingly inimical to the production of trust, commercial 
internet transactions have continued to expand and flourish. Technology has 
enabled innovative forms of exchange to emerge, spanning an ever-broader range 
of products and services. These new modalities of commerce challenge traditional 
organizational and market frameworks. This Article studies the emergence of trust 
in “social commerce,” a phenomenon that has heretofore received scant attention in 
academic literature. By social commerce, I refer to a form of electronic commerce 
that utilizes user-generated content, social media, and other modes of social 
connection to facilitate commercial transactions in cyberspace.13 I use the term 
broadly to encompass not only social media, but also any form of collaborative 
social communication that implicates the fusion of social and commercial 
networks. This could take the form of product recommendations and wish-lists 
from friends,14 collaborative networks among sellers15 or buyers, or online forums 
and communities centered on a product or service. 
By trust, I refer to the economic notion of calculative or cognitive trust—that 
is, trust that the other party will not shirk or otherwise take advantage of one’s 
vulnerability in the exchange.16 It is the calculated decision to transact with another 
based on an assessment that the gains from trusting the other person outweigh the 
risk that that person will cheat. This differs from affective or personal trust, which 
                                                          
 
13 Stephen Guo et al., The Role of Social Networks in Online Shopping: Information Passing, Price of 
Trust, and Consumer Choice, 12 ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY 157, 157 (2011), available at 
http://nlp.stanford.edu/pubs/wang-ec11.pdf (defining “social commerce” as the use of personal social 
networks to gather information and make purchasing decisions). 
14 David Beisel, (The Beginnings of) Social Commerce, GENUINEVC (Dec. 6, 2005), http://genuinevc 
.com/archives/2005/12/06/the-beginnings-of-social-commerce.html. 
15 Andrew T. Stephen & Olivier Toubia, Deriving Value from Social Commerce Networks, 47 J. 
MARKETING RES. 215, 215 (2010) (defining social commerce as “an emerging trend in which sellers are 
connected in online social networks and sellers are individuals instead of firms”). 
16 Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 483–
84 (1993). 
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refers to a general attitude of optimism about the goodwill of others.17 Affective 
trust underlies most lay conceptions of trust; it is predicated on the existence of 
personal relationships—ties of kinship, friendship, and past experience cultivated 
over time.18 
Most studies of calculative trust in commercial internet transactions focus on 
the role of reputation and reputation-based sanctions in deterring fraud and 
inducing parties to cooperate. Commenters have cited limitations on verifying the 
accuracy of reputation information as a structural constraint of the reputation-based 
model.19 Others have bemoaned the loss of trust in online interactions more 
generally.20 With the vast proliferation of networked personal information that 
characterizes social commerce, these concerns have become less compelling. In 
contrast to the initial wave of Web 1.0 electronic commerce companies in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, social commerce represents a marked movement away from 
anonymity and impersonality toward transparency and disclosure. Although it, too, 
is driven primarily by the reputation-based model, social commerce centers on the 
personalization and socialization of one-shot commercial transactions using Web 
2.0 technologies.21 
Beyond the obvious point that one is more likely to trust a product or service 
that is recommended by a friend rather than a stranger, the trust dynamics of social 
commerce involve a complex interplay of different factors. This Article identifies 
several mechanisms that are conducive to the formation of trust in social 
commerce: (1) information disclosure via public and private communications; 
(2) pre-play or post-play barriers to entry; and (3) community policing as a 
substitute for centralized monitoring. These mechanisms interact to mimic the 
                                                          
 
17 Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1464 (2005). 
18 See Williamson, supra note 16, at 483–84. 
19 See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 12, at 1168. 
20 E.g., Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Trust and Online Interaction, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1579 (2013). 
21 Web 2.0 refers to internet sites that feature user-generated content, bi-directional communication, 
online collaboration, sharing, and interoperability. See Graham Cormode & Balachander 
Krishnamurthy, Key Differences Between Web 1.0 & Web 2.0, FIRST MONDAY (June 2, 2008), 
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/2125/1972. This differs from Web 1.0, where the vast majority of 
users do not create content, but are simply consumers of content. Id. Some have begun referring to Web 
3.0, a third generation of the Web, characterized by use of semantic web technologies, natural language 
processing, machine learning, and artificial intelligence technologies. See Nova Spivack, Web 3.0: The 
Third Generation Web is Coming, LIFEBOAT FOUNDATION, http://lifeboat.com/ex/web.3.0 (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2015). 
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characteristics of closely-knit environments, creating conditions conducive to trust 
formation. I study these factors in the context of four social commerce settings: 
(1) individuals and businesses in the so-called “sharing economy”; (2) next 
generation electronic commerce companies; (3) online escort services; and 
(4) online black markets in credit cards and controlled substances. The private 
ordering systems that have emerged in these online markets rely in large part on 
counteracting the information asymmetry and accountability problems inherent in 
any impersonal, loosely-knit setting. 
This Article attempts to answer several questions. First, how does trust 
emerge in one-shot interactions of dispersed, non-face-to-face, sometimes non-
identifiable strangers in social commerce? Second, what roles do information, 
anonymity, and identifiability play, and what is their relationship to trust? Third, 
what impact does law have on the decentralized extralegal systems that have 
emerged in these markets? 
Part I defines social commerce and trust, and provides an overview of the 
major typologies of social commerce. Part II discusses the trust-enhancing 
mechanisms discussed above in the context of the sharing economy, next 
generation electronic commerce companies, online escort services, and the online 
credit card and drug black markets. Part III discusses the role played by 
information, anonymity, and identifiability. Part IV analyzes the interrelationship 
of law and trust in these online markets. 
I. DEFINITIONS 
A. Social Commerce Defined 
Numerous definitions of “social commerce” exist. Yahoo first used the term 
in 2005 to describe communities of shoppers using Pick Lists and user ratings to 
provide product information and advice to other users.22 It has since been defined 
as “advertising . . . generated by a friend . . . to provide consumers with rich social 
context and relevancy to the purchases which they are making”;23 “[a] strategy of 
connecting customers to customers online and leveraging those connections for 
                                                          
 
22 David Beach & Vivek Gupta, Social Commerce via the Shoposphere & Pick Lists, YAHOO! (Nov. 14, 
2005, 9:33 PM), http://www.ysearchblog.com/2005/11/14/social-commerce-via-the-shoposphere-pick-
lists/. 
23 Beisel, supra note 14. 
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commercial purpose”;24 “enabling consumers to browse, view, and add products to 
a shopping cart, within the context of a social site, like Facebook or a blog”;25 and 
“working with or using your social graph, which is defined as your followers or 
your friends, and allowing them to help you make buying decisions.”26 Some 
academics have limited the term to collaborative networks of online sellers, as 
opposed to networks of online buyers. Andrew Stephen and Olivier Toubia have 
defined it as “an emerging trend in which sellers are connected in online social 
networks and sellers are individuals instead of firms.”27 Others have defined it 
more generally as “an Internet-based commercial application, leveraging social 
media and Web 2.0 technologies which support social interaction and user 
generated content in order to assist consumers in their decision making and 
acquisition of products and services within online marketplaces and 
communities.”28 
The different definitions of social commerce may be classified into two broad 
groups: (1) e-commerce that grows out of existing social media sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter; and (2) social networks that grow out of existing e-
commerce sites such as Amazon or eBay. The former definition is narrower, with 
social media as a condition requisite for the social commerce designation. 
Examples include “Buy” buttons that allow consumers to make purchases directly 
from their Facebook or Twitter accounts. The latter definition is broader, 
encompassing any form of community or social connection surrounding a product 
or service. These can include user forums, ratings, reviews, and referrals designed 
to exchange advice, opinions, and experiences. 
This Article adopts the latter, broader definition of social commerce. I do not 
limit the term to electronic commerce that occurs on social media sites; rather, I use 
the term to refer to a type of electronic commerce that allows individuals to 
                                                          
 
24 Sam Decker, The Big Idea Behind Social Commerce, IMEDIA CONNECTION (June 14, 2007), 
http://www.imediaconnection.com/content/15372.imc. 
25 Fumi Matsumoto, Social Commerce: Strategies for Extending Online Shopping Beyond the E-
Commerce Site, DIRECT MARKETING NEWS (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.dmnews.com/digital-
marketing/social-commerce-strategies-for-extending-online-shopping-beyond-the-e-commerce-site/ 
article/157433/. 
26 Paul Dunay, The Future of Social Shopping, EMARKETER (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.emarketer.com/ 
Article.aspx?R=1007302. 
27 Stephen & Toubia, supra note 15, at 215. 
28 Zhao Huang & Morad Benyoucef, From E-Commerce to Social Commerce: A Close Look at Design 
Features, 12 ELECTRONIC COMM. RES. & APPLICATIONS 246, 247 (2012). 
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generate content and connect socially with others interested in the same products or 
services. These others need not be friends, but can be verified strangers. I also do 
not distinguish between “social commerce” and “social shopping.”29 Social 
commerce as used in this Article refers to communities of not only sellers, but also 
buyers, lenders, borrowers, and other groups. Social commerce is also not limited 
to legal markets, but can extend to quasi-legal and illegal markets as well. 
B. Typologies of Social Commerce 
Many different forms of social commerce have emerged in recent years. This 
section identifies five typologies of social commerce: (1) social network platform 
sales; (2) group buying and gifting; (3) participatory commerce; (4) person-to-
person or peer-to-peer (“P2P”) and business-to-consumer (“B2C”) sales; and 
(5) the sharing economy.30 This Article will focus on the latter two categories. 
By social network platform sales, I refer to sales that are driven by social 
networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Pinterest.31 These can 
include “Buy” buttons that appear on ads and posts from businesses, many of 
which allow users to purchase products without ever having to leave the social 
networking site. Additionally, many businesses have their own Facebook pages, 
and when a user “Likes” a particular product or brand, she becomes part of a 
community of buyers who are then offered special promotions, early access to new 
products, etc.32 The user’s friends and family are also made aware of her “Likes” or 
purchases, spurring further sales. 
In group buying, websites such as Groupon or Living Social offer discounted 
products and services conditioned on sale to a threshold number of purchasers.33 
Large groups of dispersed individuals purchase goods collectively at wholesale 
                                                          
 
29 Some have limited the term “social commerce” to collaborative networks of online sellers and “social 
shopping” to networks of online shoppers. See Stephen & Toubia, supra note 15, at 215. 
30 Lauren Indvik, The 7 Species of Social Commerce, MASHABLE (May 10, 2013), http://mashable.com/ 
2013/05/10/social-commerce-definition/. 
31 Id. 
32 Matt Anderson et al., Turning “Like” to “Buy” Social Media Emerges as a Commerce Channel, 
BOOZ & COMPANY, INC. 7 (2011), available at http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/BaC-
Turning_Like_to_Buy.pdf. 
33 For an examination of Groupon in the context of the Assurance Game, see Julia Y. Lee, Gaining 
Assurances, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1137 (2012). 
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prices, coordinated by a central intermediary. On group gifting websites such as 
eDivvy.com, individuals act collectively to contribute a gift for a target recipient.34 
In participatory commerce, consumers become active participants in the 
production process, working collaboratively to design products. For instance, Nike 
now allows consumers to design their own shoes, and ModCloth allows shoppers to 
vote on what designs are carried in stores.35 
In P2P product sales, individuals sell products or services directly to other 
individuals using P2P sales platforms. Examples include eBay, Etsy, and Amazon 
Marketplace, which provide a forum for individuals to communicate and buy and 
sell products to one another.36 In B2C product sales, businesses sell products to 
consumers with the aid of user ratings and reviews. I include within this category 
next generation electronic commerce companies such as Alibaba, which provides 
B2C and business-to-business sales through web portals that connect manufacturers 
and businesses to buyers worldwide.37 I discuss Alibaba in more detail in Part III 
below. 
Finally, the sharing economy refers to a socio-economic system built around 
extracting value from, and sharing access to, existing goods and services.38 Also 
known as the “peer-to-peer economy,” the “collaborative economy,” or 
“collaborative consumption,” sharing economy platforms allow individuals to 
exchange goods and services directly. In the standard usage of the phrase, owners 
rent out personal assets that they are not using, including cars, housing, and 
household items. Access substitutes for ownership: via the internet, owners of 
underused assets connect to those willing to pay to use them.39 The model works 
especially well for expensive goods that are not widely or consistently used, such 
as cars, boats, and bicycles. 
                                                          
 
34 Anderson et al., supra note 32, at 7. 
35 Indvik, supra note 30. 
36 Id. 
37 See About Alibaba.com, ALIBABA.COM, http://activities.alibaba.com/alibaba/following-about-alibaba 
.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2015); see also Alibaba Group, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Alibaba_Group (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
38 Benita Matofska, What Is the Sharing Economy?, PEOPLE WHO SHARE, http://www.thepeoplewho 
share.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
39 All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013, at 13. 
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The sharing economy may be conceptualized into three broad categories: 
(1) product service systems; (2) redistribution markets; and (3) collaborative 
lifestyles.40 In product service systems, individuals and companies rent goods as 
services, rather than selling them as products (e.g., renting out a power drill). In 
redistribution markets, preowned goods are swapped, given away, or sold (e.g., 
swapping of used children’s clothing). In collaborative lifestyles, individuals share 
their time, space, skills, and money. Examples include renting rooms, apartments, 
homes, and work spaces; ride-sharing; P2P lending (LendingClub, Prosper); and 
outsourcing of errands and odd jobs (TaskRabbit, HouseCall). Car-sharing 
arrangements consist of car-rental services where individuals pay to borrow 
someone else’s car (Buzzcar, Getaround, RelayRides, Wheelz, WhipCar) or taxi 
services in which individuals drive passengers in their own cars (Lyft, Uber, 
SideCar).41 With accommodation rentals, individuals may rent anything from a 
spare bed or couch to an entire house (Airbnb, Roomorama).42 The vast majority of 
these markets do not involve sharing in the traditional sense, but the exchange of 
goods or money for profit. 
The sharing economy shares several characteristics with social network 
platforms, group buying and gifting, participatory commerce, and P2P and B2C 
sales. In all of these forms of social commerce, sales and commercial activity are 
socially driven. Technology has allowed geographically dispersed groups of 
family, friends, or strangers to connect with one another, coordinate their actions, 
and communicate about the same products and services. This relational connection 
forms the core of social commerce. Although the desire to sell products and 
services ultimately drives social commerce platforms, they try to achieve this goal 
through the cultivation of community, trust, and social relationships. As I argue 
below, community is a key component of the central dynamic of social 
commerce—the formation of trust. 
C. Trust Defined 
Trust is an elusive concept that has defied a uniform or consistent definition. 
It has been referred to as an essential social glue that increases efficiency, lowers 
transaction costs, reduces complexity, renders cooperation possible, and contributes 
                                                          
 
40 RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE 
CONSUMPTION 71–73 (2010). 
41 All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 39, at 13. 
42 Id. 
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to the maintenance of social order.43 It is “a simplifying strategy” that enables 
individuals to cope with an uncertain, complex, and uncontrollable future.44 
Economist Fred Hirsch defined it as a “public good” that is crucial to the success of 
many economic transactions.45 Similarly, Kenneth Arrow noted the presence of 
trust in nearly every economic transaction and found that higher levels of trust 
correlated with higher rates of investment and growth.46 
Many definitions describe trust as a subclass of risk.47 In economic exchange, 
the terms of exchange are explicit, but the obligations carry the risk of 
opportunism. When there is risk of opportunism, trust comes into play.48 The 
greater the level of risk, the greater is the potential for trust or distrust.49 Sociologist 
James Coleman has noted, “[s]ituations involving trust constitute a subclass of 
those involving risk. They are situations in which the risk one takes depends on the 
performance of another actor.”50 Similarly, Diego Gambetta has theorized, “[f]or 
trust to be relevant, there must be the possibility of exit, betrayal, defection” by the 
trusted.51 
                                                          
 
43 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 23 (1974); see also PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE 
& POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 64 (1964); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES & THE 
CREATION OF PROSPERITY 151–52 (1995); NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST & POWER (1979); TALCOTT 
PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (Bryan S. Turner ed., 1991). 
44 PIOTR SZTOMPKA, TRUST: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 25 (1999) (quoting T. EARLE & G.T. 
CVETKOVICH, SOCIAL TRUST: TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN SOCIETY 38 (1995)). 
45 BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST 8 (1983). 
46 See ARROW, supra note 43; Elinor Ostrom & James Walker, Introduction, in TRUST & RECIPROCITY: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 3, 6. 
47 I refer to risk as unsystematic risk—i.e., risk that can be reduced through diversification of 
investment. Systematic risk cannot be reduced through diversification. See Charles K. Whitehead, 
Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 339 (2011). 
48 Karen Schweers Cook, Networks, Norms, and Trust: The Social Psychology of Social Capital, 68 
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 4, 9 (2004). 
49 Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 474 (2002). Oliver Williamson takes 
issue with the use of trust to describe situations where the risk one takes depends on others’ 
performance. See Williamson, supra note 16, at 463 (quoting JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF 
SOCIAL THEORY 91 (1990)). 
50 COLEMAN, supra note 49. 
51 Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 
213, 218–19 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988). 
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Numerous definitions of trust exist. Part of the difficulty with defining trust is 
that it has been studied across diverse intellectual disciplines, with each discipline 
applying its own analytical lens. For instance, psychologists have analyzed the 
personality side of trust, sociologists the social structural side, and economists the 
rational choice side.52 Further complicating the definition, trust carries a multitude 
of meanings in everyday usage.53 I will discuss the definitions of trust most 
relevant to my analysis—cognitive v. affective trust, generalized v. particularized 
trust, and primary v. secondary trust. 
This Article focuses on cognitive, particularized, secondary trust. Cognitive or 
calculative trust refers to the decision by one party, A, to make itself vulnerable to 
another, B, based on the belief that B will not act opportunistically.54 Particularized 
or relational trust refers to the type of specific trust that develops between two 
individuals within a particular context.55 Secondary trust refers to trust based on the 
experience of others, rather than personal experience. I discuss each in more detail 
below. 
Cognitive trust involves a calculated assessment of whether the benefit from 
trusting another outweighs the risks involved. It is an economic concept rooted in 
cost-benefit analysis. Saying that A trusts B means that A believes that there is a 
reasonably high probability that B will not try to take advantage of A.56 Trust 
implies that A is confident, but not necessarily certain, that B will behave in the 
expected way.57 In one variant—Russell Hardin’s “trust as encapsulated interest”—
an individual, A, trusts another individual, B, because it is in B’s interest to fulfill 
A’s trust.58 A trusts B because B’s interest encapsulates A’s interests.59 
                                                          
 
52 D. Harrison McKnight & Norman L. Chervany, Trust and Distrust Definitions: One Bite at a Time, in 
TRUST IN CYBER-SOCIETIES: INTEGRATING THE HUMAN & ARTIFICIAL PERSPECTIVES 28, 29 (Rino 
Falcone et al. eds., 2001). 
53 Id. at 29–30. 
54 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of 
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1739–40 (2001); see also Gambetta, supra note 51, at 217 
(“When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability 
that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to 
consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him.”). 
55 Cook, supra note 48, at 9. 
56 Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting & Trustworthiness, 81 B.U. L. REV. 523, 527 (2001). 
57 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Trust, Honesty, & Corruption: Reflection on the State-Building Process, 42 
EUR. J. SOC. 526, 526 (2001). 
58 RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST & TRUSTWORTHINESS 3 (2002). 
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Trustworthiness refers to B’s objective qualities: if B is trustworthy, he is the type 
of person who would not try to exploit A’s vulnerability even if it is advantageous 
to do so.60 Trust depends on an assessment of the trustworthiness of the other party. 
If A has reason to think B will be trustworthy, then A trusts B.61 Distrust, on the 
other hand, involves an attitude of suspicion or pessimism about the motives of 
others.62 
Cognitive trust differs from affective trust in several ways. Affective trust—
otherwise known as internalized, personal, or emotive trust—is emotional and 
irrational; cognitive or calculative trust is reasoned and strategic.63 Affective trust 
has been referred to as “real” or “true” trust, as opposed to calculative trust, which 
is more strategic. An individual with high affective trust has a propensity to believe 
in the trustworthiness of humans in general.64 This type of trust, which can be 
described as more of a feeling than a thought,65 focuses on the internal mental state 
of the trusting actor and is characterized by an absence of monitoring.66 It reflects a 
baseline psychological attitude, rather than trust in individuals to do specific 
things.67 In this sense, it is similar to generalized trust. 
Generalized trust refers to a general predisposition to trust others.68 It is an 
individual trait characterized by a “default” belief in the “benign nature of humans 
                                                                                                                                      
 
59 Id. 
60 Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 56, at 527; Blair & Stout, supra note 54, at 1740. Honesty, which 
involves truth-telling and responsible behavior, is not identical to trustworthiness. See Rose-Ackerman, 
supra note 57, at 526 (“A person may be honest but incompetent and so not worthy of trust.”). 
61 Russell Hardin, Gaming Trust, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM 
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 80, 83. 
62 Hall, supra note 49, at 474. 
63 Cross, supra note 17, at 1459. 
64 Cook, supra note 48, at 9. 
65 Hall, supra note 49, at 483; see also Cross, supra note 17, at 1465. 
66 Richard Craswell, On the Uses of “Trust”: Comment on Williamson, “Calculativeness, Trust and 
Economic Organization,” 36 J.L. & ECON. 487 (1993); Williamson, supra note 16, at 483–84. 
67 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 57, at 529. 
68 Generalized trust is similar to “social trust,” which refers to individuals’ views about the 
trustworthiness of others. See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 136–38 (2000). Social trust grows out of social bonds and group identity. See 
Tom R. Tyler, Why Do People Rely on Others? Social Identity and the Social Aspects of Trust, in TRUST 
IN SOCIETY 285, 286 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2001). 
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in general.”69 It has been described as a “standing decision” “to give most people—
even those whom one does not know from direct experience—the benefit of the 
doubt.”70 Generalized trust arises when individuals internalize a set of moral values 
that predispose them to expectations of honest behavior in others.71 An individual 
with low generalized trust will trust no one unless given proof of trustworthiness.72 
Generalized trust extends to individuals we do not know personally. Individuals 
with high levels of generalized trust may trust others in one context, but not 
others.73 An individual’s level of generalized trust is partly a product of a person’s 
past experiences.74 
By contrast, particularized trust—otherwise known as relational or 
interpersonal trust—refers to interrelationships between people, specifically an 
individual’s trust in a particular person with respect to a particular situation.75 I 
conceive of two types of particularized trust: primary trust and secondary trust. 
Primary trust stems from repeat interactions and direct personal experience; 
secondary trust from the experience of others. Traditionally, particularized trust has 
been conceived of as primary trust—that is, trust that arises through face-to-face 
transactions between individuals who know one another. Putnam termed this type 
of trust “thick trust,” which he defined as trust grounded in strong and frequent 
personal relationships.76 Thick trust tends to arise in small, closely-knit, 
homogeneous societies and most commonly between family members and close 
friends.77 However, as I posit in this Article, particularized trust may also arise in 
non-face-to-face transactions between individuals who do not personally know one 
another, but only know of one other. In other words, particularized, secondary trust 
may arise between two people based on reputation and institutional controls. 
                                                          
 
69 Cook, supra note 48, at 9. 
70 Wendy M. Rahn & John E. Transue, Social Trust & Value Change: The Decline of Social Capital in 
American Youth, 1976-1995, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 545, 545 (1998), quoted in PUTNAM, supra note 68, at 
136. 
71 FUKUYAMA, supra note 43, at 153. 
72 Cook, supra note 48, at 9. 
73 Id. 
74 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 57, at 539. 
75 Id. at 538–39. 
76 PUTNAM, supra note 68, at 136. 
77 See id.; see also Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Trust, Distrust, and in Between, in DISTRUST 60, 65–66 
(Russell Hardin ed., 2004); Rebecca M. Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 591 (2009). 
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Often, an individual’s level of trust cannot be neatly characterized as affective 
or cognitive, or generalized v. particularized, but is a combination of both.78 
Certain types of social commerce—in particular, those that involve trading of 
services that culminate in repeat, face-to-face meetings with the same individual—
may implicate both affective and cognitive trust. 
While this Article focuses on cognitive and particularized trust, it does not 
deny the importance of affective or generalized trust. Just as every individual has a 
different tolerance for risk, an individual’s willingness to trust depends on a 
complex interplay of affective trust and situation-specific factors that are 
determinative of cognitive trust. While the former is a product of direct, personal 
experiences and individual-specific attributes, the latter may vary from situation to 
situation. Affective trust may be viewed as an initial baseline that varies according 
to the individual’s internalized proclivity to trust. The baseline is the starting point 
from which an individual makes the decision to trust in any one context. From that 
point, there are alternative gateways to cognitive trust: (1) primary, particularized 
trust grounded in repeated interactions and personal experience; and (2) secondary, 
particularized trust based on the experience of others. Again, my focus is on the 
latter. Secondary trust operates as the main gateway to trust in the type of loosely-
knit, geographically dispersed settings that characterize social commerce. This 
gateway constricts or expands according to the presence of certain structural and 
contextual conditions that I discuss in the next Part. Hence, although the Article 
acknowledges that there may be internalized, emotional motivations to trust in any 
one context, it focuses on the external social and economic incentives that impact 
an individual’s rational, calculated decision to transact with another. 
II. TRUST IN SOCIAL COMMERCE 
How does trust emerge in one-shot commercial transactions between non-
face-to-face, geographically dispersed strangers in social commerce? Much of the 
literature on trust in cyberspace focuses primarily on the role of reputation.79 In this 
Part, I detail a multi-layered, private system of incentives and controls that extend 
beyond reputation. If one imagines trust as the spoke of a wheel, reputation 
comprises only one of the rods. The other components include information, 
                                                          
 
78 Cross, supra note 17, at 1471. 
79 See, e.g., Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 56, at 527, 542. For general literature on the role of 
reputation, see THE REPUTATION SOCIETY 51–53 (Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey eds., 2011) and Lior 
Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1667 (2008). 
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visibility, familiarity, and accountability, which are all key elements in the 
formation of community. 
Community—that is, a network of social relationships—lies at the heart of 
social commerce. These communities may range from small, micro-communities of 
indignant buyers or sellers swindled by the same miscreant to expansive 
communities of all buyers of a company’s products. The formation of community 
makes trust possible, for community membership creates a commitment to 
continuity in relationships, generates pressure to cooperate from multiple sources, 
and affords community members multiple channels for pursuing violators of trust.80 
Although the communities in social commerce are virtual, the personalization of 
exchange relations and culture of transparency that characterize social commerce 
operate as close substitutes for traditional, closely-knit, physical communities. The 
degree of personalization and transparency varies depending on the legal, quasi-
legal, and illegal nature of the marketplace. 
Below I study the emergence of trust in four sectors of social commerce: the 
sharing economy, next generation electronic commerce companies, online escort 
services, and the online credit card and drug black markets. I identify three 
common elements that bind each of these markets: (1) voluntary disclosure of 
information via public and private communications; (2) pre-play or post-play 
barriers to entry; and (3) community policing. 
A. Voluntary Disclosure of Information 
The characteristic features that have defined cyberspace—anonymity, 
impersonality, and heterogeneity—also are least conducive to trust formation. One 
of the central mechanisms for increasing the willingness to trust is transparency. 
Anonymity and secretiveness breed distrust; conversely, personalization and 
transparency generate trust.81 Information is said to be the lifeblood of exchange 
markets. Information on the interests and disposition of the other party forms the 
basis of assessments of trustworthiness.82 In many social commerce markets, we 
are seeing a trend away from impersonal, anonymous transactions toward 
individuated, non-anonymous ones. Market actors voluntarily disclose a wealth of 
                                                          
 
80 Carol Heimer, Solving the Problem of Trust, in TRUST IN SOCIETY, supra note 68, at 40, 55; Mark 
Granovetter, Economic Action & Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 
491 (1985). 
81 See SZTOMPKA, supra note 44, at 123–24. 
82 Heather Hamill & Diego Gambetta, Who Do Taxi Drivers Trust?, 5 CONTEXTS no. 3, 2006, at 29, 30. 
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personal information about themselves to signal their trustworthiness. Open lines of 
communication connect buyer and seller. These communications consist of both 
public self-disclosure and private, one-on-one communication via email or instant 
messaging. 
The ease of obtaining and exchanging information results in a free flow of 
information that simulates a fundamental feature of closely-knit communities. 
Traders have strong incentives to disclose information—with no disclosure, they 
will have difficulty finding exchange partners. Imagine an Airbnb host profile with 
no name, photos, reviews, personal information, or details of the rental location. 
Such a host would have difficulty finding renters. Sellers who disclose less 
information would sustain a price discount to compensate buyers for the increased 
risk. The market would drive out traders who failed to disclose a competitive 
amount of information. 
Experimental studies have consistently found that repeated pre-play 
communication substantially increases levels of cooperation and trust.83 Without 
communication, cooperation among individuals in the Prisoner’s Dilemma tends to 
decrease over trials.84 Pre-play communication has marked effects on generating 
trust.85 Face-to-face communication generates the most consistent results, with 
audio-visual communication providing a close substitute.86 Communication creates 
a form of personal relationship, however fleeting, creating a reluctance to cheat.87 
Direct communication, combined with high visibility and a culture of openness, 
also generate a sense of familiarity. As Giddens has noted, “‘familiarity’ is the 
keynote to trust.”88 Even when counterparties are strangers, a sense of familiarity 
                                                          
 
83 Ostrom, supra note 3, at 29; Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 56, at 545; Mark Isaac & James 
Walker, Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, 26 ECON. 
INQUIRY 585, 592 (1988). 
84 Karen S. Cook & Robin M. Cooper, Experimental Studies of Cooperation, Trust, and Social 
Exchange, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL 
RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 209, 228. 
85 Id.; see also John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE HANDBOOK 
OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111, 156–68 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Elinor 
Ostrom, Collective Action & the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 146 (2000). 
86 Ostrom, supra note 3, at 29. 
87 Thomas S. Ulen, Review: Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
487, 495 (1994). 
88 Anthony Giddens, Living in a Post-Traditional Society, in REFLEXIVE MODERNIZATION 56, 81 
(Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens & Scott Lash eds., 1994). 
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may result from a commonality of interests, acquaintances, etc. The cultivation of 
transparency and familiarity is perhaps best exemplified by the emerging sharing 
economy. 
1. The Sharing Economy 
Many sharing economy platforms provide a forum for parties to share 
information and communicate directly with one another, often with personal photos 
and other identifying information. Feastly, an online marketplace that connects 
diners to home cooks, includes photos and personal biographies of every chef.89 On 
Airbnb, nearly all hosts post photos and a short description of themselves. Many 
list their education, work, hobbies, interests, Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn 
profiles, as well as other personal information. The voluntary disclosure of personal 
information runs both ways. Guests must create profiles before they can book 
reservations, and many also post personal photos and information about 
themselves. Airbnb provides two modes of communication between guests and 
hosts: email and private messaging. Before booking, guests may contact hosts 
using an online messaging system. After a reservation has been accepted, email 
addresses, phone numbers, and listing addresses are shared.90 
Similarly, on Kiva.org, a P2P lending platform, individual lenders may 
browse profiles of borrowers from around the world. Borrower profiles include the 
borrower’s name, photo, personal story, and future aspirations, as well as the 
intended use of the funds. Borrowers seek loans for a variety of purposes, from 
growing their business, to paying for tuition, to moving to safer and cleaner forms 
of energy.91 Lenders also have profiles that disclose their name, occupation, 
location, and lending activity, often accompanied by a personal photo.92 On 
KivaZip.org, lenders and borrowers can communicate directly with one another via 
email or instant messaging. Borrower profiles include public discussion boards 
where lenders and borrowers can post messages to one another and to the public.93 
                                                          
 
89 See About, FEASTLY, https://eatfeastly.com/info/about/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
90 See Why Can’t I Call or Email a Guest or Host Before Booking?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ 
help/article/44 (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
91 See About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Oct. 30, 2015); How Kiva Works, KIVA, 
http://www.kiva.org/about/how (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
92 See Kiva Lender Paul-Alexander, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/lender/paulalexander4385?super 
_graphs=1 (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
93 See Caitlin, Plough in the Stars Farm, KIVA ZIP, https://zip.kiva.org/loans/10837 (last visited Oct. 30, 
2015). 
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The sharing economy’s facilitation of direct communication and transparency 
also fosters an atmosphere of familiarity, safety, and security. With the availability 
of a wealth of information about exchange partners, individuals may forum shop 
for like-minded or similarly-situated individuals. Many drivers use ride-sharing 
platforms to give rides only in the direction of their commute to work or school.94 
For instance, Sidecar allows passengers to choose a particular driver from a list of 
nearby available cars, allowing female passengers to choose female drivers.95 
KivaZip.org creates security in numbers by providing the total number, identity, 
and profiles of other lenders making similar loans to that particular borrower.96 On 
Airbnb and other platforms, the linkage of accounts to Facebook profiles injects 
some modicum of familiarity into interactions with strangers. I may be more 
willing to transact with you, even if we have never met if, for instance, one of my 
friends is a friend of your friend. 
Contrast this with the trust dynamics of traditional taxi drivers and their 
passengers. Passengers enter cabs with no information about their drivers, relying 
instead on the integrity of municipal licensing requirements and the company’s 
interest in maintaining a positive reputation. Drivers are in an even more vulnerable 
position; they must make split-second decisions about the trustworthiness of their 
passengers. Picking up the wrong customer can have dire consequences. In the 
United States, taxi drivers are sixty times more likely to be murdered on the job 
than the average worker and are the victims of more violent assaults than any 
occupation other than police and security guards.97 In dealing with strangers in 
situations where there is a significant probability of being attacked or cheated, 
drivers resort to relying on heuristics—age, sex, and race—in the absence of other 
information. 
Diego Gambetta and Heather Hamill have theorized that in conditions of high 
uncertainty, taxi drivers approach trust decisions through cues that are costless for 
those who truly possess them, but costly for others to mimic.98 Drivers prefer older, 
                                                          
 
94 Carolyn Said, Why Do Women Like Driving for Lyft, Sidecar and Uber?, S.F. GATE (Oct. 17, 2014), 
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Why-do-women-like-driving-for-Lyft-Sidecar-and-5830862 
.php. 
95 See Sidecar Now Lets You Choose Women Drivers, SFIST (Dec. 19, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://sfist 
.com/2014/12/19/sidecar_now_lets_you_choose_women_d.php. 
96 See Caitlin, Plough in the Stars Farm, supra note 93. 
97 Hamill & Gambetta, supra note 82, at 29. 
98 Id. at 30. 
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female, and white passengers over passengers who are younger, male, and black, 
presumably because these characteristics are difficult to simulate.99 This results in 
the notorious difficulties faced by black male passengers in hailing cabs, 
particularly in large cities. Sharing economy ridesharing platforms, by virtue of the 
wealth of information made available to both passengers and drivers, displace 
reliance on heuristics to assess the trustworthiness of exchange partners.100 
2. Next Generation Electronic Commerce 
Next generation B2C companies, such as Alibaba, utilize similar strategies to 
promote transparency. Alibaba, the world’s largest online and mobile commerce 
company, provides a platform through which buyers and sellers can chat with one 
another before entering into a transaction. When necessary, the website handles the 
English-Chinese translation. Customers negotiate, communicate, and build 
relationships with suppliers through instant messaging and email, rather than 
through traditional face-to-face meetings. To further facilitate communication, 
Alibaba hosts a discussion forum for buyers and suppliers. Company profiles with 
links to the supplier’s website provide information on location; factory size; total 
revenue; main markets; export percentage; number of product lines and staff; trade, 
production, and research and development capacity; year of establishment; and 
trademarks and patents. The websites often include multiple photographs of the 
factories, workers, and products.101 Contacts are identified by full name and job 
title, rather than a pseudonymous username. Some suppliers provide a personal 
photo and cell phone number in addition to their business address and fax 
number.102 
Social commerce B2C companies attempt to humanize their corporate images 
by personalizing content and simulating the behavior of individuals. Many 
companies now have Facebook and Twitter pages, where customers can “Like” the 
company and its products, submit complaints and concerns, and become part of a 
community of customers. The companies converse with their customers on social 
media platforms such as Instagram, Pinterest, or Tumblr. Many solicit user-
                                                          
 
99 Id. at 31–32. 
100 Lior Strahilevitz has made a similar argument, though not in the context of the sharing economy. See 
Strahilevitz, supra note 79, at 1674. 
101 See, e.g., Chongqing Bright Source Electronics Co., Ltd., ALIBABA.COM, http://powercy.en.alibaba 
.com/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
102 See, e.g., Ananta Cooperation Ltd., ALIBABA.COM, http://th106697808.fm.alibaba.com/ 
contactinfo.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
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generated content using social media.103 Company websites disclose personal 
information about the company and its founders, including the company’s “story,” 
workers, and animating philosophy. 
Etsy, a P2P electronic commerce website, seeks to create the unique shopping 
experience of boutiques, craft fairs, and flea markets by offering handmade items, 
vintage goods, and personalized craft supplies.104 Sellers connect directly with 
buyers via personal storefronts where they share their personal stories, perpetuating 
the sense that one is transacting with a real person, rather than a company.105 The 
site features “community tastemakers” who publicize their favorite products from 
different storefronts and have their own group of followers. Etsy’s mission 
statement, to build “a human, authentic and community-centric global and local 
marketplace” where consumers can discover unique goods and “build relationships 
with the people who make and sell them,” encapsulates social commerce. 
3. Online Escort and Prostitution Services 
The transparency, individuation, and personalization that have characterized 
the sharing economy and next generation B2C and P2P companies extend into the 
quasi-legal and illegal realms of online escort and prostitution services.106 Much 
like the ridesharing platforms, Lyft and Uber, specialist websites and apps connect 
escorts and clients with a mere click or swipe. Slixa, a localized directory of escorts 
and erotic masseuses, allows customers to browse profiles of local escorts by city. 
Competitive pressures encourage the disclosure of large amounts of personal 
information. Each escort maintains a personalized profile page complete with 
autobiographical information, photographs, prices, and rules of behavior.107 The 
site publicly discloses escorts’ email addresses and phone numbers, allowing them 
                                                          
 
103 Naveen Jain, Brand Yourself for a Better Life, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2013, 12:56 PM), http://www 
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104 See, e.g., About Etsy, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/about/?ref=ftr (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
105 See id.; see also Om Malik, Meet the Man Behind New York’s Other Billion Dollar Internet 
Company. This One Makes Money, GIGAOM (Aug. 23, 2013, 1:03 PM), https://gigaom.com/2013/08/23/ 
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106 Unlike prostitution, which is illegal in all states except Nevada, escort services are generally legal. 
See US Federal and State Prostitution Laws and Related Punishments, PROCON.ORG (2015), 
http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000119#2. However, because escort 
services are frequently a front for prostitution, I categorize them as quasi-legal. 
107 Dylan Love, This Startup Has Created a Facebook for Escorts, BUS. INSIDER (July 23, 2013, 
8:31 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/slixa-hire-an-escort-online-2013-7. 
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to be contacted by anyone browsing the website. Users may register to follow their 
favorite escorts’ status updates.108 In addition to purchasing personal profile pages, 
escorts may pay premiums for additional exposure on a given city’s webpage or for 
site-wide exposure.109 
Peppr, a new app, allows individuals to type in a location and immediately 
view a list of the closest prostitutes complete with photos and prices.110 Information 
flows easily between buyer and seller: escorts and prostitutes provide detailed 
profiles and personal web pages, including information on age, bust or dress size, 
ethnicity, location, sexual orientation, range of services, rates, schedule, and 
requirements.111 Although many use pseudonyms, nearly all post personal—and 
often intimate—photos. Many include other personal details such as personality, 
hobbies, and passions. The platforms allow buyer and seller to communicate 
directly with one another via email or instant messaging. 
4. The Online Black Market: Credit Cards and Drugs 
Unlike legal and quasi-legal exchange markets, illegal online markets in drugs 
and stolen credit cards naturally do not generate the same levels of voluntary 
disclosure. Secrecy and anonymity prevail, as avoiding detection by law 
enforcement remains the overarching imperative. Even so, sellers voluntarily 
disclose a surprising amount of information about themselves. Criminals, just as 
other commercial actors, have an interest in communicating, identifying one 
another accurately, advertising their products, and signaling their 
trustworthiness.112 Vendors maintain their own profiles and links to their personal 
webpages, including a short description, contact details, and detailed terms and 
conditions of proper behavior on their sites.113 
Because competition among vendors is fierce, customer service takes 
precedence. Websites devoted to the sale of illegal drugs provide photographs of 
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products and prominent links to customer service complaints.114 Personal vendor 
websites post frequently asked questions and provide incentives such as discounts 
for repeat customers and bulk orders.115 Others post refund policies to engender 
trust. On the black market site 2pac, site operators warrant that they will replace 
“bad dumps” (i.e., invalid credit card numbers) “within 12 hours after purchase” 
and replace “bad CC(CVV2)” security codes “within 3 minutes after purchase.”116 
Replacements involve a “full refund of item cost to account balance.”117 
Just as in legal and quasi-legal markets, the platforms allow for direct 
communication between buyer and seller, though messages are encrypted and 
automatically deleted.118 Secure forums and discussion boards facilitate 
communication between users of the site and create an online community of 
users.119 Users frequently share advice, tips, and tricks of the trade. For instance, 
bulletin board sites where users buy and sell stolen data offer entry-level tutorials 
on how to get started in the credit card fraud business.120 Even in impersonal, 
anonymous black markets, open lines of communication increase transparency, 
thereby facilitating trust. 
B. Barriers to Entry 
Both pre-play and post-play barriers to entry are another component in the 
generation of trust. I distinguish between two types of barriers to entry: 
(1) anticompetitive barriers to entry—that is, barriers to entry designed to keep out 
rivals; and (2) defensive barriers to entry—that is, barriers to entry that seek to 
keep out the untrustworthy.121 I focus on the latter. Overall, the internet has 
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dramatically lowered anticompetitive barriers to entry by making it easier for 
outsiders to enter the relevant market. As I discuss below, the private ordering 
system that has emerged relies on defensive barriers to entry to generate trust. 
Barriers to entry have been a tool for counteracting transactional uncertainty 
for centuries. Historically, this has taken the form of trading within “natural 
groups,” such as clans or tribes, or within ethnically homogenous trading groups.122 
Examples include the East Indians of East Africa, the Syrians of West Africa, the 
Lebanese of North Africa, the Chinese of Southeast Asia, and the Jews of medieval 
Europe, all of whom tended to trade exclusively among themselves.123 Geographic 
proximity, ethnic homogeneity, and repeat dealing facilitate the formation of 
informal communication networks and reputation bonds that reduce the risks of 
transacting.124 Avner Greif has shown that eleventh-century Maghribi traders 
overcame problems associated with the use of overseas agents by relying primarily 
on membership in religious-ethnic coalitions. The coalitions served as information 
transmission vehicles and reputation mechanisms for ensuring proper conduct. As 
coalition membership depended on proper conduct in the past, it effectively created 
a linkage between past conduct and future income.125 Lisa Bernstein has shown a 
similar dynamic at work among Jewish traders in the diamond markets in the 1980s 
and 1990s.126 
In geographically concentrated, homogenous groups, information travels 
through word-of-mouth, repeat dealing, and personal contacts.127 With online 
trading, internet technology has reduced the costs of collecting and disseminating 
information cheaply to a large number of counterparties.128 Barriers to entry do not 
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serve their traditional function of information and reputation transmission 
mechanisms; rather, they serve to filter out untrustworthy actors from the relevant 
market. In this sense, they function like state licensing requirements. By placing 
controls on group membership, barriers to entry serve to create a sense of security 
and community. Pre-play barriers to entry operate as a screening device and may 
take the form of certifications, references, and background checks. Post-play 
barriers to entry operate as a sanctioning mechanism, excluding individuals for past 
bad behavior. I discuss each in turn. 
1. Pre-Play Barriers to Entry 
a. The Verified Non-Criminal 
Legal and quasi-legal markets utilize both pre-play and post-play barriers to 
entry as a mechanism for generating trust. By screening and excluding the 
untrustworthy, barriers to entry create a sense of exclusivity, perpetuating a sense 
of group identity. In the sharing economy, before sellers of goods and services can 
transact on the relevant site, they must register and pass screening checks. Ride-
sharing services such as Uber and Lyft require drivers to undergo criminal 
background checks and ongoing reviews of motor vehicle records. The safety 
features go both ways. Drivers have access to passengers’ identities, photos, and 
credit-card numbers before they are picked up, reducing the risks that a rider will 
rob or assault the driver. On Lyft, passengers must link their account to their 
Facebook profile before they can use the platform. Drivers rate their passengers, 
allowing drivers to avoid or effectively ban problematic passengers.129 
Airbnb requires verification of the identity of guests and hosts through the 
scanning of identification documents and linkage to social network sites such as 
Facebook. All hosts must upload a profile photo, and guests are asked to upload a 
photo before making their first reservation.130 TaskRabbit, a mobile marketplace 
for hiring people to do odd jobs and tasks, requires all “rabbits” to be interviewed 
and have their backgrounds checked before advertising on the system.131 
DogVacay, an online platform connecting pet owners with pet sitters, requests that 
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sitters undergo a clearance process, including training videos, quizzes, and a 
telephone interview in order to earn their pet-sitting badges and credentials.132 
Similarly, escorts and prostitutes generally require clients to submit names, 
references, employment verification, background and health checks, telephone 
numbers, and email addresses prior to the transaction. An entire industry that tailors 
to these demands has burgeoned.133 Roomservice 2000 provides background 
checks that clients can present to sex workers. Apps such as Healthvana provide a 
means for workers and clients to share verified sexual-health test results.134 In 
Britain, prostitutes may use the database Ugly Mugs to verify punters’ names and 
telephone numbers.135 
For these mechanisms to serve their intended purpose, the barriers to entry 
must be rigorously implemented and enforced. Consider the effects of inadequately 
policed barriers to entry. Alibaba relies on an authentication and verification 
process for sellers called Gold Suppliers, a premium membership for suppliers 
wishing to maximize their exposure to potential customers. Gold Supplier members 
pay membership fees and demonstrate their authenticity by either passing an onsite 
check for Chinese suppliers or an Authentication & Verification (“A&V”) check 
for other sellers. During the onsite check, Alibaba employees check the supplier’s 
premises to ensure that onsite operations exist and confirm the supplier’s legal 
status and other information through a third-party verification agency. The A&V 
check for non-Chinese suppliers consists of verifying the supplier’s business 
license and contacts, but does not involve onsite inspection.136 
In 2011, Alibaba uncovered a massive fraud involving its own workforce. Its 
salespeople knowingly granted Gold Supplier certification to more than 2,300 
fraudulent suppliers who accepted payments, but never delivered the promised 
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goods. The scandal rocked Alibaba—critics faulted the company for certifying 
Gold Suppliers without a rigorous verification process, letting its online 
marketplace grow faster than it could handle.137 Although the damage was 
relatively small (approximately $2 million), about 100 salespeople and top 
management were fired, and the CEO and COO resigned.138 Alibaba’s response did 
much to contain the damage, but nevertheless raised the specter of a systemic loss 
of trust and confidence in the integrity of its verification systems. 
b. The Verified Criminal 
Online black markets rely on reverse barriers to entry—keeping out the non-
criminal. A fascinating web of safeguards and controls interact to winnow the 
universe of traders to the paradoxical “trustworthy” criminal. Mechanisms vary 
depending on the type of market. Illegal drug markets generally operate on the Tor 
anonymizing network, an encrypted browser that shields the identity of users and 
browsing activity. Much of the trading in illegal goods occurs on websites that can 
only be accessed via Tor. For instance, the now-defunct website Silk Road, one of 
the most successful multibillion dollar online drug bazaars, could not be viewed 
without Tor.139 
Alternatively, some black markets operate on the standard internet but erect 
barriers to entry through an intricate web of usernames, passwords, and third-party 
verifiers. In the credit card black market, vendors must undergo at least two layers 
of screening before they can sell their product. First, they must pass a preliminary 
screening process to establish their criminality. Prospective sellers and purchasers 
cannot see or enter the site without a username and password. In order to obtain the 
username and password, prospective users must convince two references who are 
already in the site to write to the forum moderators and vouch for their 
criminality.140 Only then may they view the site. Once they have established their 
criminal credentials, they must then establish their trustworthiness. In order to 
prove that they are capable of doing business honestly, prospective sellers submit a 
set of sample credit card numbers to designated reviewers. After testing the cards, 
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reviewers submit reviews and vouch for the seller to become a vendor on the 
site.141 The practice of submitting sample stolen credit card numbers signals two 
things: (1) that the prospective seller has committed a crime and therefore is less 
likely to be an undercover agent; and (2) that he or she is a bona fide seller. 
Many markets utilize a combination of Tor and the referral screening process. 
On Agora Marketplace, formerly one of the largest online drug markets on the dark 
net operating as a Tor hidden service, both buyers and sellers were required to use a 
referral link called an Agora Invite to gain access to the site and register as a 
user.142 Similarly, the stolen data black market site Lampeduza Republic utilizes a 
system where reviewers verify a prospective vendor’s services or products. 
Prospective sellers may become verified by submitting a $25,000 good faith 
deposit with the site’s administrators, providing evidence of at least 500 functional 
credit card records, or if they are selling distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) 
attacks, bringing an entire website down for an agreed-upon period of time.143 
Referrals and product testing simultaneously signal criminality and trustworthiness. 
2. Post-Play Barriers to Entry 
Post-play barriers to entry serve a different function—to ostracize and punish 
traders who have demonstrated their untrustworthiness. Because most parties wish 
to conduct more than one transaction, fear of exclusion plays a vital role. The 
prospect of foreclosing on future mutually beneficial exchanges operates as a check 
on advantage-taking behavior. In a well-publicized case in 2011, an Airbnb host 
named EJ returned home to find her San Francisco apartment trashed by a renter. 
The guest, along with some friends, had smashed a hole through a locked closet 
door and stolen the host’s passport, cash, credit card, camera, laptop, and 
grandmother’s jewelry.144 Airbnb responded by working with law enforcement to 
apprehend the suspect and permanently banned the guest from the site. They also 
instituted insurance of up to $1 million for hosts and established a 24/7 customer-
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service hotline, among other safeguards.145 Airbnb’s website informs guests that 
their accounts may be deactivated or canceled, their passwords disabled, and access 
to the site blocked at any time, with or without notice.146 
Similarly, the threat of termination and exclusion operates as a restraint on 
bad behavior by providers. Alibaba implements an elaborate fraud and dispute 
procedure. If a customer files a fraud complaint, Alibaba collects evidence from the 
buyer and allows the supplier to submit counter-evidence. If, after investigation, 
Alibaba determines that fraud has occurred, it suspends the supplier’s account for 
fifteen days. If the complaint is not resolved within the suspension period, Alibaba 
terminates the supplier’s account and blacklists the supplier.147 In effect, ostracism 
substitutes for money damages as a deterrence mechanism. 
Uber and Lyft also retain the right to fire drivers at will. They both have a 
policy of firing drivers accused of assaulting or harassing passengers, and have an 
informal policy of cutting drivers with user ratings below a 4.5 or 4.6.148 The 
requirement that both parties register and upload profile photos reduces the 
likelihood that banned individuals will be able to simply change their identities and 
re-enter the site. Although this is less true in online black markets, where users 
continue to remain at least partially anonymous, these markets have proven 
remarkably adept at identifying and banning scammers. 
C. Community Policing 
While barriers to entry serve a screening and deterrence function, community 
policing contributes to trust by performing an information transmission, 
verification, and monitoring function. In closely-knit groups, trust forms through 
repeated interactions developed over time, and reputation spreads through word-of-
mouth, rumors, and gossip.149 Traders cooperate with one another because they 
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expect either reciprocity or retaliation in future interactions with the other party.150 
In other words, the “shadow of the future” restrains behavior in the present.151 
In many legal, quasi-legal, and illegal markets, online user reviews supplant 
past personal experience and P2P gossip. Online intermediaries aggregate and 
distribute feedback on past behavior such that isolated, one-shot interactions take 
on the characteristics of long-term relationships.152 Positive reputations function as 
personal assets, as traders painstakingly build a record of positive reviews over 
time. The task of monitoring for good behavior rests in the hands of a vast, 
disaggregated community of users. Rather than relying on one centralized entity to 
ensure that traders are making accurate representations and performing their end of 
the bargain, the system relies on all users. 
In addition, the online ratings system perpetuates the perception that most 
individuals are trustworthy. If a large number of people are or appear to be 
trustworthy and honest, this encourages others to be honest.153 If one expects the 
other party to be trustworthy, one is more likely to behave in a trustworthy 
manner.154 In effect, the online review system allows individuals to observe others 
trusting and acting trustworthily, encouraging the feeling that one’s own trust is not 
misplaced.155 
Nevertheless, the system suffers from numerous weaknesses. First, Resnick 
and Zeckhauser have shown that the overwhelming majority of reviews are 
positive, suggesting that users either fear retaliatory negative reviews or simply 
seek to avoid unpleasant interactions.156 Second, users can create fraudulent 
reviews that either artificially inflate their ratings or lower the ratings of 
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competitors.157 Third, users can all too easily change their identities, allowing 
negative reputations to be erased.158 However, the growing trend toward 
personalization and individuation of exchange markets may counteract these risks. 
Moreover, the combination of preemptive monitoring by information 
intermediaries and the enlistment of an army of monitors and evaluators functions 
as a check on advantage-taking. In effect, community policing generates trust by 
spreading the costs of verification and creating a regime of hyper-accountability. 
1. The Sharing Economy 
Most sharing economy platforms rely on active intermediation, user reviews, 
and online forums to police bad behavior. Airbnb proactively monitors user activity 
for potential risks. Its computer analytics system assigns each reservation a “trust 
score,” with low scores automatically flagged for further investigation. Red flags 
include large groups, first-time renters or hosts, repeated bookings between the 
same parties, and use of the words “Western Union,” among others. For instance, if 
a host and guest repeatedly book rooms with one another, this raises a red flag that 
the transaction could be a scheme to generate false positive reviews.159 In addition, 
Airbnb maintains a staff of investigative agents to track down guests who have not 
left rentals in an appropriate condition.160 
To deal with the problem of user aversion to writing negative reviews, Airbnb 
transitioned to publishing reviews only after both the host and guest had submitted 
their respective reviews. Under the former system, where reviews were published 
as soon as they were submitted, if one person left a negative review, the 
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counterparty could retaliate with a negative review of her own.161 The new system 
provides incentives for both parties to write honest evaluations. 
Advances in technology have empowered users to perform their own 
verification functions. Ride-sharing services such as Lyft and Uber provide the 
technological means to immediately verify that the driver is legitimate and 
trustworthy. When passengers request a ride, they receive a text confirmation that 
includes the driver’s name, photo, car, license plate number, and make, model, and 
color of the car. They can track their driver’s arrival via GPS and instantly check to 
see whether their driver has taken the shortest route.162 
2. Escort and Prostitution Markets 
Community policing also characterizes trading between buyers and sellers in 
the escort and prostitution markets. Profiles contain reviews of the prostitutes 
customers have visited, including descriptions of their experiences, the services 
provided, prices paid, and quality of the premises. Sites such as 
TheEroticReview.com allow clients to review sex workers whom they have 
encountered, including the accuracy of representations made on the workers’ 
profiles.163 Similarly, escorts and prostitutes use online forums and services to warn 
one another of violent or unsafe clients. These online forums allow escorts and 
prostitutes to identify and connect with one another, creating a sense of community. 
Websites such as the National Blacklist aggregate complaints, allowing women to 
report clients who are abusive or fail to pay.164 
3. Credit Card and Drug Black Markets 
Like in legal markets, both the illegal drug and credit card black markets rely 
heavily on a reputation system based on user reviews.165 Users rate products on a 
scale of one to five based on shipping time, product quality, and customer 
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service.166 Sellers who are not found to be reliable or trustworthy face immediate 
negative feedback.167 If a user has a record of negative feedback, site moderators 
reserve the right to flag that user with a “ripper” tag, permanently labeling that user 
as one who cannot be trusted.168 
Across different Tor hidden service forums and surface net forums, a 
community of users continuously monitors the market, both for security 
vulnerabilities and for scammers.169 Forums alert users to scam sites and vendors. 
Deepdotweb.com maintains a list of “dead/scam markets.” For instance, it warns 
users to avoid “Drugmarket,” noting, “Scam site—AVOID Or your money will be 
lost.”170 On “Flomarket,” it warns, “Market was hacked and the admin lost all 
funds—read our exclusive interview with Flole—the market admin for all the 
details regarding the shutdown.”171 User-generated blogs and specialist forums 
research different marketplaces, collect user experiences, and assess security 
features.172 
The community of users also guards against vendors who try to game the 
review system.173 These include using fake accounts, paying others to generate 
positive reviews, and posting negative reviews of competitors.174 On The Rumour 
Mill, one of the most popular forums for drug sites like the now-defunct Silk Road, 
reputations and products are vetted, and scammers are systematically exposed.175 
For instance, on one occasion, a group of buyers came together to expose a vendor 
named “theDrugKing” who was writing his own feedback.176 A group of users 
scrutinized all of his posts, gathered evidence, and reported him to the site 
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administrators.177 Despite the widespread use of pseudonyms, users have managed, 
at least to a certain extent, to weed out and punish the untrustworthy.178 
III. INFORMATION, IDENTIFIABILITY, AND ANONYMITY 
What, then, is the role of identifiability and anonymity in generating trust? 
This Article has argued that social commerce represents a larger trend toward 
identifiability, transparency, and the personalization of exchange relations. Are 
these necessary elements for the development of trust? I discuss the 
interrelationship of information, identifiability, and anonymity and their relation to 
trust below. 
A. Information 
Information is central to the development of trust. Information reduces 
uncertainty, allowing individuals to evaluate the trustworthiness or competence of 
the other party.179 It may range from personal information, including the 
individual’s name, birth date, residence, work, and hobbies, to reputational 
information—that is, “information about the actor’s past performance that helps 
predict the actor’s future ability to perform . . . .”180 One may conceive of 
information as a spectrum ranging from no disclosure on one end to full disclosure 
on the other. The greater the level of disclosure, the more likely it is for trust to 
develop. 
The level of disclosure varies depending on the legal, quasi-legal, or illegal 
nature of the marketplace. The sharing economy and other legal social commerce 
markets fall to the right of the spectrum, illegal online markets fall to the left, and 
quasi-legal market fall somewhere in the middle. Legal social commerce platforms 
enjoy the greatest level of disclosure, with parties voluntarily disclosing vast 
amounts of information about themselves and their product. In legal and quasi-legal 
markets, market participants make themselves visible, accessible, and familiar by 
posting personal profiles, photos, and the identities of their friends and 
acquaintances. As discussed above, even in illegal markets, participants disclose a 
surprising amount of information about themselves and their product. 
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In illegal markets, although market participants disclose less information, 
what is disclosed takes on greater significance. The exchange of compromising 
information not only signals trustworthiness, but also serves a hostage-taking 
function, partly offsetting the partial anonymity and lack of transparency of these 
markets. In an illegal market, any disclosure of information, including the very act 
of participating in the illegal marketplace, grants the other side leverage.181 For 
example, possession of stolen credit card numbers is, itself, incriminating, allowing 
the counterparty to take that information hostage. Granted, in an illegal 
marketplace, both parties are culprit; the mutual exchange of negative information, 
however, binds both parties, contributing to the formation of trust.182 
B. Identifiability 
With enough disclosure of information, identification can result. Identification 
can result from disclosure of a person’s name, social security number, physical 
characteristics, address, signature, fingerprint, or other indicia of identity, such as 
“likes, dislikes, habits, opinions, and preferences.”183 Identifiability turns on the 
nature and amount of information disclosed and the person making the 
identification. Being identifiable to one person does not mean that one is 
identifiable to others. In addition, different types of information increase 
identifiability to different types of individuals. A social security number or 
fingerprint to a lay person means something different than a social security number 
or fingerprint to a law enforcement agent. 
The ability to identify the communicator can be valuable in that it enhances 
accountability and the reliability of the communication.184 A user who is tempted to 
leave a false negative or positive review may be deterred from doing so if her name 
is attached to the review. Hence, identification can protect the accuracy of available 
information. Moreover, identifiability protects the integrity of barriers to entry and 
facilitates community policing, both of which are critical components in generating 
trust. Although a requirement of identifiability runs the risk of chilling 
communications, many social commerce platforms have successfully implemented 
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such a requirement. Airbnb, Lyft, Uber, and other information intermediaries 
require verification of identity as a prerequisite to becoming users of their sites. 
Many also require use of profile pictures and other identifying information. 
But does trust require identifiability? The prevalent use of pseudonyms and 
usernames in quasi-legal and illegal markets suggests not. Trust does not require 
the disclosure of one’s true identity: reputation and trust may be built on stable 
pseudo-identities and the disclosure of enough information to establish one’s 
credibility and trustworthiness. If most or all users of a site use pseudonyms, the 
use of a pseudonym, itself, does not signal lack of trustworthiness. For instance, 
escorts and prostitutes may wish to shield their true identities not because they 
intend to shirk or defraud, but because they do not want their friends, families, or 
coworkers to learn of their activities. Moreover, although identification serves as a 
useful tool for locating other community members, stable pseudonyms and the 
disclosure of adequate information can accomplish the same purpose. 
C. Anonymity 
Anonymity may be viewed as the flip side of identifiability. It is the condition 
of not being identifiable—i.e., having one’s true identity withheld or obscured.185 
Anonymity is not a binary concept, but one of degree.186 I distinguish between 
partial anonymity (pseudonymity) and complete anonymity. One of the contentions 
of this Article is that social commerce represents a shift away from anonymity 
toward the personalization of exchange relations. Even in quasi-legal and illegal 
markets, complete anonymity does not exist. Market pressures result in the 
disclosure of different indicia of identity, such as a seller’s personal idiosyncrasies 
and preferences. Escorts post profile pictures and intimate personal information in 
order to attract clients and distinguish themselves from others. The near-universal 
use of pseudonyms serves the function of obscuring true identity, and stable 
pseudonyms allow for the development of reputation and trust.187 
Anonymity, whether partial or complete, encourages communication and 
disclosure.188 But anonymity may also undermine trust by obstructing access to 
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relevant information, reducing accountability, and making judgments of 
trustworthiness more difficult.189 Anonymity also facilitates the ability to change 
one’s online identity, allowing individuals with negative reputations to simply 
assume new identities.190 Notably, anonymity in illegal online markets functions 
less to encourage communication than to prevent identification by law 
enforcement. This suggests that at least in the context of social commerce, 
anonymity may be less deserving of protection than in other contexts. 
Nevertheless, the ability of trust to emerge in illegal markets demonstrates 
that partial anonymity and trust are not mutually exclusive. Of course, one might 
say that illegal online markets do not involve trust, but merely represent instances 
of cooperation without trust. However, if trust is defined as a belief that the other 
party will not try to take advantage of one’s vulnerabilities, one may conclude that 
trust can emerge even in the face of partial anonymity. 
IV. LAW AND TRUST 
The synergies in the private ordering systems that have emerged in these 
markets raise the question of what role, if any, law plays. Much of the legal 
literature on trust tends to converge on the question of whether law facilitates or 
impedes trust. Proponents of the former view contend that law reduces the risks of 
transacting, enabling parties to overcome mutual suspicion.191 At one extreme is the 
traditional Hobbesian view that a powerful system of legal rules is necessary to 
facilitate cooperative interactions.192 Without a centralized external authority to 
impose and enforce sanctions, problems of distrust would frustrate otherwise 
beneficial exchanges. By assigning entitlements and providing remedies in the 
event of breach, law induces individuals to honor their bargains.193 
Contract law provides the classic solution to the problem of uncertainty and 
distrust. If I wish to transact with you, but I neither know nor trust you, I may insist 
on a lengthy, detailed contract to protect me in the event you turn out to be 
untrustworthy. The protection runs both ways. If either party fails to perform, the 
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non-breaching party may employ the coercive powers of the state to punish the 
breacher.194 Contract law reduces the risk of defection by providing remedies in the 
event of nonperformance195 and providing assurances that the other party will be 
held accountable.196 In this way, contract law counters mutual suspicion between 
the parties, allowing transactions that would otherwise be hampered by distrust to 
go forward.197 Contracts can enhance trust by reducing risk associated with a 
transaction,198 clarifying the understanding between the parties,199 reducing the 
chances of betrayal,200 and establishing norms of behavior.201 
Many scholars dispute these claims, arguing that law, by its nature, 
undermines trust.202 Some argue that contract law threatens trust, while regulation 
increases it;203 others argue the converse.204 Still others reject the salutary effect of 
law altogether.205 These scholars contend that law crowds out true, affective trust 
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grounded in “reciprocity, moral obligation, and fellow-feeling.”206 Relational 
contract theorists point to the marginal importance of contracts in business 
relationships, arguing that detailed contracts could actually dissipate trust between 
the parties.207 For instance, Stewart Macaulay found that Wisconsin businessmen 
often preferred to conduct business on a handshake rather than through detailed 
contracts, despite exposure to significant risks.208 Macaulay showed that 
meticulous planning and legal sanctions played a very small role in many business 
exchanges.209 
However, the findings of relational contract theory are most relevant to 
individuals and businesses in long-term relationships. The common assumption has 
been that when strangers deal with one another in one-shot commercial 
transactions, clear legal rules and contracts play a critical role in overcoming 
distrust.210 This may indeed be the case in high-value, high-stakes, business-to-
business transactions. However, law plays a limited role in engendering trust in 
social commerce transactions, many of which involve relatively low-value, 
geographically dispersed, P2P or B2C transactions. This is most apparent in illegal 
markets, where legal recourse is nonexistent. Instead, extra-legal mechanisms have 
evolved for eliciting the trust required for commercial exchange. 
What insights can be drawn from the commonality of mechanisms across 
legal, quasi-legal, and illegal boundaries? I frame my discussion in terms of 
mechanisms that operate within and outside the shadow of the law, borrowing from 
the metaphor first coined by Martin Shapiro and made famous through the works of 
Marc Galanter, Robert Mnookin, and Lewis Kornhauser.211 
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A. Trust in the Shadow of the Law 
Although formal law is seldom invoked in social commerce transactions, it 
does not follow that it plays no role in the generation of trust. Legal and quasi-legal 
markets may be said to operate within the shadow of the law—that is, the extra-
legal mechanisms discussed above have force because they are ultimately backed 
by state coercion.212 In addition to directly governing behavior, law “provid[es] a 
background of norms and procedures against which private negotiations and 
[interactions] take place.”213 In their seminal work on divorce settlements, Mnookin 
and Kornhauser argued that the primary function of the law of divorce was to 
provide a framework under which divorcing couples could bargain for rights and 
responsibilities outside of the courtroom.214 Law performs a similar coordinating 
function in legal and quasi-legal markets.215 
In devising mechanisms to induce trust between exchange partners, 
information intermediaries have borrowed traditional legal tools and structured 
their markets to track legal requirements. For instance, Airbnb offers insurance 
coverage of up to $1 million for Airbnb hosts if a guest is accidentally injured 
anywhere in the host’s building or property during a stay.216 Most sites also offer 
escrow services and detailed dispute resolution procedures.217 Alibaba’s fraud and 
dispute resolution procedure is strikingly similar to error resolution procedures set 
out in the Truth in Lending Act218 and the Electronic Fund Transfers Act.219 
Certification requirements and background checks closely track state and municipal 
licensing requirements. 
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Information intermediaries perform a gatekeeping function similar to that 
performed by self-regulatory organizations.220 By collecting and disseminating 
information and reviews, they increase transparency and reduce information 
asymmetries. By independently verifying information, they increase the level of 
accurate information in the marketplace. The screening and monitoring functions 
performed by online intermediaries, such as Airbnb, Lyft, and Alibaba, have been 
detailed above. In addition, by routinizing and standardizing disclosure, they 
facilitate the comparative use of information. Finally, their ability to police barriers 
to entry operates as a sanctioning and deterrence mechanism. 
However, their effectiveness turns on their ability to convince users of the 
objectivity and accuracy of the information provided. Although concern for their 
reputational capital operates as an effective quality-control mechanism,221 
vulnerabilities remain. First and foremost, information intermediaries are 
compensated by the very parties they are monitoring. Revenue derives from service 
fees from bookings, generally in the range of 3% to 15% of the price of the good or 
service.222 This fee structure creates an incentive to increase the volume of 
transactions at the expense of quality. Second, although all information 
intermediaries are repeat players, reputational controls operate most effectively as a 
check on the very largest and nationally recognized, leaving the others susceptible 
to capture. Third, information intermediaries may be lax in their gatekeeping role, 
allowing inaccurate information and untrustworthy actors to enter the marketplace. 
Without robust institutional controls in place, high-quality goods and traders could 
be driven out of the market and displaced by “lemons,” or fraudulent 
commodities.223 
Two forces incentivize information intermediaries to conscientiously execute 
their gatekeeping role: (1) reputational concerns; and (2) the desire to avoid direct 
regulation. Instances of property damage, theft, personal injury, or other 
complications, though relatively rare, are widely publicized. Opponents of the 
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sharing economy routinely cite public safety, health, and labor concerns, arguing 
that the public interest mandates direct government regulation.224 They point to the 
need to protect consumers from fraud, tax evasion, and unskilled or unsafe service 
providers. For example, P2P ride taxi services have been fined for operating 
without public liability and property damage insurance coverage and workers’ 
compensation insurance.225 The threat of litigation and regulation has functioned as 
a catalyst, incentivizing information intermediaries to devise alternatives to legal 
rules and entitlements in an effort to demonstrate their redundancy. 
B. Trust Outside the Shadow of the Law 
Rather than operating within the shadow of the law, the online credit card and 
drug black markets, as with any illegal market, represent instances of order without 
law. In criminal economies, disputes cannot be settled in courts and contracts are 
unenforceable. The private ordering system that has emerged represents a 
categorical rejection of law. Extra-legal rules and enforcement mechanisms operate 
entirely outside the boundaries of the state.226 Fear of law enforcement drives the 
structural architecture of these markets—criminal (or at least non-law-enforcement) 
identification is a necessary precondition to trust. Barriers to entry and community 
policing serve a dual function of not only certifying and verifying the truthfulness 
of disclosed information, but also of erecting a first line of defense against law 
enforcement. 
For illegal markets, any question of substantive regulation is overshadowed 
by the overarching public policy goal of uprooting criminal activity. After all, the 
prevention of theft is a core function of the state. Yet if the experience of Silk Road 
and Silk Road 2.0 is any indication, elimination of one market spurs multiple 
progeny in its place.227 How should the state respond to a situation where at least 
some negative externalities associated with the illegal good or service are reduced 
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by moving them online? On the one hand, these markets have emerged as safer, 
more convenient alternatives to traditional face-to-face dealing. Breaches of trust 
are met with online gossip and ostracism, rather than violence. One view is that the 
optimal regulatory response is to allow some violations to occur, as the overall 
costs of enforcement would exceed the costs of the violations.228 On the other hand, 
if these markets were to become too successful and profitable, they would generate 
significant negative externalities, including an increase in the number of market 
participants and the overall expansion of online crime.229 
V. CONCLUSION 
Rational choice theory predicts that in conditions of high transactional 
uncertainty, trust will not emerge absent externally imposed constraints such as 
law. The geographically dispersed, one-shot, non-face-to-face nature of 
transactions in social commerce creates a significant risk of opportunism. Yet these 
markets continue to grow and flourish. Existing scholarship has recognized the role 
of technological change in providing a low-cost means of disseminating 
reputational information. This Article has sought to add to that literature by 
situating reputation within the broader framework of trust. Reputation contributes 
to trust, but it represents only one aspect of a larger system. In economic exchange, 
a calculated decision to make oneself vulnerable to another is rooted in a complex 
interplay of personal risk tolerances, past experiences, and structural conditions 
such as repeat play and face-to-face contact. In loosely-knit, geographically 
dispersed groups, trust is not grounded in repeat interactions or personal 
experience, but in the experience of others. For trust to develop, reliable safeguards 
and controls must be in place. 
In this Article, I have identified three mechanisms that are conducive to the 
formation of trust in social commerce: (1) communication and voluntary disclosure 
of information; (2) barriers to entry; and (3) community policing. These 
mechanisms interact to mimic the characteristics of closely-knit groups. In place of 
face-to-face contact, a culture of voluntary disclosure and direct communication 
has taken hold, part of a larger movement toward the personalization of exchange 
relations. Gossip occurs in online forums, rather than in neighbors’ homes. Good 
behavior is monitored by dispersed communities of users, rather than village elders. 
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What is lost in homogeneity and cohesiveness is arguably made up in volume. 
Barriers to entry and community policing perform a screening, sanctioning, and 
monitoring function that imposes costs on opportunistic behavior. Collectively, 
these mechanisms represent an endogenously created, private response to the 
problem of accountability and asymmetric information. The commonality of 
mechanisms across legal, quasi-legal, and illegal markets suggests that these 
mechanisms do not depend on the legal system for their efficacy. They supplement 
the law in areas where it exists and substitute for law in areas where it does not 
exist. They are an alternative to, not an extension of, the law. 
